

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

13 June 1951

SUBJECT: *SE-7*  
~~NE-41~~ PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO THE INCLUSION OF GREECE  
AND TURKEY IN WESTERN DEFENSE AGREEMENTS  
(Third Draft)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet reactions to (a) the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO; (b) the formation of a Mediterranean Defense Pact including Greece and Turkey, with the US as a member; and (c) security arrangements between Greece and Turkey and certain individual NAT nations, including the US.

CONCLUSIONS

1. We estimate that the Kremlin is unlikely to precipitate a general war because of the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in any of the security agreements listed in this problem.

2. We are unable to determine whether the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in a security pact which included the US would or would not increase the willingness of the Kremlin to accept greater risks of

JUN 13 1951

~~SECRET~~

general war in local actions anywhere in the world in support of its policy objectives.

3. We believe that the Kremlin regards the existing Western security arrangements in the Near East as an obstacle to Soviet expansion in the Near East and as a potential threat to the security of the USSR. We believe that the Kremlin will regard the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in a defense pact which also includes the US as a further obstacle to Soviet expansion in Europe as well as in the Near East, and as increasing the potential threat to USSR security which the Kremlin already discerns in Western defense arrangements.

4. We believe that the Kremlin will react to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Western security arrangements with intensified political warfare, including various modes of political and economic pressure upon Western countries, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda, and perhaps increased covert support to revolutionary activities in vulnerable areas.

5. While any defense agreement which involved a US commitment to defend Greece and Turkey would be objectionable to the USSR, it is probable that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO or in a Mediterranean pact which included the US, Britain and France, would be regarded by the Kremlin as a more formidable obstacle to Soviet expansion and as a greater potential menace to the USSR than an agreement which did not include these Western European powers.

~~SECRET~~

6. We believe, furthermore, that since the US has publicly proposed that Greece and Turkey be admitted to NATO, a refusal by Britain or France to undertake firm security commitments to those countries would be interpreted by the Kremlin as revealing weakness and dissension among the members of the Western alliance. Such a development would to some extent offset the advantages which might be gained from a subsequent unilateral security commitment by the US to Greece and Turkey.

~~SECRET~~